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Ford v. Garcia:' A Puzzling Fusion of the Command
Responsibility Doctrine With the Torture Victim
Protection Act
I. Introduction
For thousands of years, people throughout the world have
resorted to torturing and murdering innocent victims in order to
achieve their goals.2 A common setting in which torture and
murder are currently found is in struggles for political power.3 In
the 1980s and early 1990s, El Salvador, a small Central American
nation-state, was entrenched in a bitter civil war in which human
rights abuses were common.4 In December of 1980, Salvadoran
National Guard soldiers kidnapped, tortured, and subsequently
murdered three nuns and one layperson.5  The soldiers who
perpetrated the crimes were ultimately convicted and sentenced to
thirty-year prison terms in El Salvador.6 General Carlos Eugenio
Vides and General Jose Guillermo Garcia, in charge of the
Salvadoran National Guard at the time of the murders, were never
tried, and subsequently moved to Florida in 1989.'
Since military or paramilitary forces carry out many cases of
torture and extra-judicial killings, unique issues of who is
responsible for these crimes arise. In most criminal and tort law
contexts, a failure to act will not subject one to liability absent an
I Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11 th Cir. 2002).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 102-367 at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85
(citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS 5 (1983)).
3 Id.
4 For a brief yet informative summary of the El Salvadoran civil war, see Enemies
of War: El Salvador: Civil War, PBS, at http://www.pbs.org/itvs/enemiesofwar/
elsalvador2.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Enemies of War] (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
5 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1286.
6 Karin Meadows, Generals Cleared: Jury Finds 2 Salvadorans not to Blame for
Nuns' Slayings, Rapes, ABC News, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/
salvadorangeneralsOO I103.html (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
7 Id.
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agency or other statutorily or judicially recognized relationship.8
Military commanders, however, hold a unique position of power
and authority over their soldiers. By law and tradition, soldiers
must follow orders issued by officers superior in rank.9 Logically,
if a commander has effective control of his soldiers, he has the
ability to prevent or stop any objectionable actions. International
law has repeatedly recognized the power of a military commander,
and domestic and international tribunals have not hesitated to
impose liability on a commander for the actions of his troops
through the command responsibility doctrine."
In 1999, the estates of the tortured and murdered victims
brought suit in United States federal court against Generals Vides
and Garcia.11  The plaintiffs relied on the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) as the statutory basis for their
lawsuit.1" Since there is no question that the defendants did not
personally torture or murder the victims, the plaintiffs relied on the
command responsibility doctrine 3 to affix liability for damages,
albeit vicariously, on the defendants. 4 At trial, the jury found for
the defendants.15 The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district
court's jury instructions and the allocation of the burden of proof.16
Since the doctrine of command responsibility and its interplay
with the TVPA had yet to be litigated in the federal courts, Ford v.
Garcia issued the first judicial interpretation of the command
8 See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 191 (1998) ("Merely witnessing a
crime, without intervening, does not make one a party to the offense, unless his
intervention was a duty .... ").
9 For example, a United States Army commission requires "other personnel of
lesser rank to render such obedience as is due an officer of this grade and position."
United States's Army Officer's Commission. For an in-depth discussion of imposing
command responsibility for a failure to act, see Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of
Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (2001).
10 See infra Part I1.
11 Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1286 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
12 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
13 See infra text accompanying note 60 (explaining the command responsibility
doctrine).
14 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1286.




responsibility doctrine and its application within the TVPA. 17 This
note will explore the facts and holding of Ford in Part II. Part III
will examine the background law, and Part IV will provide an
analysis of the court's opinion. Finally, this note will conclude
that Ford has not fully comported with Congress's intent in
enacting the TVPA.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs in Ford are representatives of the estates of Ita
Ford and Mary Clarke, two of the four American women (the
"churchwomen") who were raped, tortured, and murdered in
December 1980.18 The plaintiffs sought over $100 million in
damages.19 Reports indicate that Salvadoran soldiers tortured and
murdered the churchwomen because the soldiers believed that the
churchwomen were leftist-guerrilla sympathizers."z The soldiers
killed the churchwomen during a time when such torture and
murder were commonly' committed in El Salvador.zl
Many issues were not contested at trial. The defendants were
undisputedly the de jure military commanders of the soldiers that
raped, tortured, and murdered Mary Clark, Ita Ford, Dorothy
Kazel, and Jean Donovan.22 The defendants also admitted that
they "were aware of a pattern of human rights abuses in El
Salvador during their tenures as Minister of Defense and Director
of the National Guard." 3 Their only defense, therefore, was that
they "did not have the ability to control their troops during this
period." 4 As a result, the plaintiffs' ability to prevail depended
entirely on how the court analyzed the elements of the command
responsibility doctrine and how it allocated the burden of proof in
17 Id. at 1285.
18 Id. at 1285-86.
19 Meadows, supra note 6.
20 Id.
21 Enemies of War, supra note 4; Meadows, supra note 6.
22 See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1286 (stating that the defendants were in office when the
torture and murder occurred); infra note 67 (defining dejure authority).
23 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1286.
24 Id.
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such a case.2' The plaintiffs contended that once they met their
burden of proof regarding the command responsibility doctrine,
the burden then shifted to the defendants to prove affirmatively
that they did not have the ability to control their troops.26
The trial court, however, sided with the defendants. 27 The trial
court's jury instructions required the plaintiffs to prove: (1) all of
the elements of the command responsibility doctrine, and (2) that
the torture and murder of the churchwomen was "a direct or a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of one or both defendants'
failure to fulfill their obligations under the doctrine of command
responsibility., 28 In addition to the court's definition of the three
elements of the command responsibility doctrine, the trial court
required the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants had "effective
command" of their troops. The plaintiffs also had to prove that the
defendants' omissions caused the churchwomen's death.29
The jury believed that the defendants did not have effective
control over their troops and as a result, found for the defendants.3"
Even though the plaintiffs offered a substantial amount of
circumstantial evidence, the absence of a "smoking gun"
prevented the plaintiffs from winning.3"
25 Id. at 1285, 1287.
26 Id. at 1289-90. See infra text accompanying note 60 (noting the elements of the
command responsibility doctrine).
27 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1287.
28 Id. at 1287 nn.3-4.
29 Id. See infra text accompanying note 60 (noting the elements of the command
responsibility doctrine). The trial court varied the "superior-subordinate relationship"
element by requiring the plaintiff to prove "[t]hat persons under [the defendant's]
effective command had committed, were committing, or were about to commit torture
and extrajudicial killing." Ford, 289 F.3d at 1287 n.3. The trial court varied the "failure
to prevent and punish" element by requiring the plaintiff to prove that "[t]he defendant
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent or
repress the commission of torture and extrajudicial killing or failed to investigate the
events in an effort to punish the perpetrators." Id.




B. Holding of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals decisively interpreted the TVPA to
include "the doctrine of command responsibility., 32  The court,
however, did not have post-TVPA United States case law to help it
determine "how the doctrine [of command responsibility] should
be applied in TVPA cases. 33 Because of the absence of relevant
American case law, the court turned to international court
decisions to determine whether the burden of proof shifted to the
defendant after the plaintiff set forth prima facie evidence of an
element of the command responsibility doctrine.34 Instead of
explicitly determining where the burden of proof should rest, the
court simply upheld the trial court verdict, stating that it would not
overturn "where the district court's instruction mirrored the
language of the most recent indicia of customary international law
on this point."35
The court indicated that its interpretation of customary
international law keeps the burden of proving a commander's
effective control of his troops on the plaintiff.36 The court seems
to favor making "effective control" over troops a "threshold to be
reached in establishing a superior-subordinate relationship."37 In
his concurring opinion, Judge Barkett noted that the court failed to
address the fact that the district court's "effective command"
instruction contradicts international law because it requires a de
facto military commander to possess "legal authority" over his
troops. 38
32 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1288-89.
33 Id. at 1290.
34 Id. at 1290-93.
35 Id at 1293.
36 See id. at 1292-93 (stating that "nowhere in any international tribunal decision
have we found any indication that the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts on this issue
when the prosecutor--or in TVPA cases, the plaintiff shows that the defendant possessed
dejure power over the guilty troops").
37 Id. at 1290 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20,
2001) para. 256).
38 Id. at 1297 (Barkett, Circuit Judge, concurring). See infra note 67 for a
definition of defacto authority.
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III. Background Law
A. In re Yamashita39 and the Command Responsibility
Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the
command responsibility doctrine in the post-World War II case of
In re Yamashita.4 ° Yamashita was the Commanding General of
the Japanese Fourteenth Army Group in the Philippines.4 ' After
surrendering to the United States Army in 1945, he became a
prisoner of war and subsequently was convicted of war crimes
violations by a military commission.42 He was sentenced to death
by hanging.43  The military commission convicted General
Yamashita of violating the laws of war that forbade the infliction
of "violence, cruelty and homicide.. . upon the civilian
population and prisoners of war.,
44
General Yamashita did not personally commit the acts of
torture and violence; yet, the commission found him responsible.45
The Court stated that a commander has "an affirmative duty to
take such measures as [are] within his power and appropriate in
the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
population., 46 Yamashita, however, never addressed the "effective
control" issue and simply laid down this blanket duty. Moreover,
the court refused to review the sufficiency of any of General
Yamashita's defenses and held that such defenses "are within the
peculiar competence of the military officers composing the
commission.,
47
39 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
40 Id. Yamashita entrenched the command responsibility doctrine in American case
law. "Yamashita was the seminal Supreme Court case recognizing the three elements of
the command responsibility doctrine, as well as affirmative defenses under the doctrine."
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 706, 720 (2002).
41 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 14.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 16.
47 Id. at 17.
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Yamashita did not specifically address any burden of proof
issues in regard to the command responsibility doctrine.48
However, the Court did explain that merely charging a commander
with breaching "his duty to control the operations of the members
of his command, by permitting them to commit the specified
atrocities," was sufficient for the commission to "hear evidence
tending to establish the culpable failure of petitioner to perform
the duty imposed on him by the law of war and to pass upon its
sufficiency to establish guilt.
49
B. The TVPA and the Command Responsibility Doctrine
The plaintiffs based their claim on the TVPA.5 °  For a
defendant to be liable under the TVPA, the factfinder must
determine that the defendant subjected the victim to torture or
extrajudicial killing.51 The TVPA clearly codifies the torts of
torture and extrajudicial killing.52 Hence, a plaintiff must prove
48 Id.; Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1290 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
49 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 17.
50 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). Section
2(a) of the TVPA states that:
[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation - (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to
extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the
individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an
action for wrongful death.
Id. § 2(a).
51 Id. Section 3 of the TVPA spells out the definition for the term "extrajudicial
killing" and sets forth the standard for determining if an act is one of "torture." Id. § 3.
52 Section 3(a) of the TVPA defines "extrajudicial killing" as:
a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not
include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out
under the authority of a foreign nation.
Id. § 3(a). Torture is defined as:
any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical
control, by which severe pain or suffering.., whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from
that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that
individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a
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that the harm to the victim falls within the scope of the statute. 3
In essence, the TVPA designates torture and extrajudicial killing
as violations of international law and provides the definitions for
each. 4 Congress indicated its intention that the term "subjects"
shall be interpreted broadly by including language imposing
liability on "anyone with higher authority who authorized,
tolerated, or knowingly ignored those acts.""
American law has incorporated the doctrine of command
responsibility. The Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA) affords aliens
the ability to use American federal courts to sue the commanders
of troops who torture their victims. 6 The TVPA does not limit
claims to alien plaintiffs.57 Instead, the TVPA allows for the estate
of any victim of extrajudicial murder, regardless of nationality, to
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind ....
Id. § 3(b)(1). Section 3(b)(2) describes what acts can cause "mental pain and suffering."
Id. § 3(b)(2).
53 Since Ford is one of the first cases brought under the TVPA, there is not a
sufficient body of case law to provide guidelines or definitions for all of the terms in the
statute. The House Report, however, does provide some clarity as to the legislative
intent behind some of the statute terminology. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 2-5
(1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85-88. Prior to the passage of the TVPA,
torture victims brought claims under the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA), which did not
enumerate specific harms. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3. Instead, plaintiffs could claim a
violation of the law of nations, the scope of which is necessarily disputed in every case.
ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, Circuit Judge, concurring) (stating that the law of
nations and its applicability and definition is an area of law that "cries out for
clarification by the Supreme Court").
54 Since torture and extrajudicial killings are arguably jus cogens violations, it is
clear that torture and extrajudicial killing were actionable under the ATCA prior to the
TVPA. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that torture
is actionable under the ATCA). Jus cogens norms of international law are rules that are
"recognized by the international community of states as peremptory, permitting no
derogation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. K (1987).
The TVPA does not apply to commanders in the United States military. See Statement
by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2092, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 465
(Mar. 16, 1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 73) 91, 92.
55 See Murphy, supra note 40 at 720 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991)).
56 The Alien Tort Claim Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). See H.R. REP.
No. 102-367 at 3 (stating that aliens have been able to sue defendants for torture for
decades by invoking the ATCA).
57 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). See H.R.
REP. No. 102-367 at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86.
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maintain a suit against a non-American commander. 8
The TVPA allows for the imposition of civil, not criminal,
liability.59 Hence, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence. The three elements that a plaintiff must prove in order
to win under the command responsibility doctrine include:
1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between
the commander and the perpetrator of the crime;
2) that the commander knew or should have known, owing to
the circumstances at the time, that his subordinates had
committed, were committing, or planned to commit acts
violative of the law of war; and
3) that the commander failed to prevent the commission of the
crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates after the commission
60of the crimes.
In Ford, the district court required the plaintiffs to prove that
the defendants were exercising "effective command" over the
troops.6" The district court determined that a commander exercises
"effective command" if "the commander has the legal authority
and the practical ability to exert control over his troops. A
commander cannot, however, be excused from his duties where
his own actions cause or significantly contribute to the lack of
effective control. ' 62
Although Ford did not have any problem finding that
American courts may use the command responsibility doctrine to
affix responsibility to commanders, it did not definitively
determine on whom the burden of proof should fall.63 In order to
analyze the plaintiffs' burden of proof claims, the court looked at
how various international criminal tribunals used the command
58 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000). See H.R.
REP. No. 102-367 at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 87.
59 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
60 Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2002). Element (1) is hereinafter
designated the "superior-subordinate relationship" element. Element (3) is hereinafter
designated the "failure to prevent or punish" element.
61 Id. at 1287 n.3.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 1292 (refusing to assign either the plaintiff or defendant the burden of
proof).
2003]
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responsibility doctrine.64
C. International Tribunals
International tribunals and organizations have used the
command responsibility doctrine to impose criminal liability on
military commanders. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was established by the United
Nations Security Council in 1993,65 has repeatedly applied the
command responsibility doctrine.66
The ICTY has made a distinction between commanders
exercising de jure power compared to those exercising de facto
power.67 Current international law allows for the imposition of
responsibility on both de jure and de facto commanders via the
command responsibility doctrine.68 In Prosecutor v. Delalic,69 the
ICTY stated that a court may presume that a commander who
possesses de jure authority has effective control over his
subordinates "unless proof to the contrary is provided."7
Regardless of whether a commander exercised de jure or de facto
authority, the ICTY has defined "effective control" as "a material
ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct, however that control
64 Id. at 1289.
65 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. (1993).
66 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20, 2001). Article
7(3) of the ICTY Statute empowers the Tribunal to use the command responsibility
doctrine to impose criminal liability on commanders of troops who commit the crimes of
torture and extrajudicial murder. See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Statute, U.N. Doc.
S/25704, art. 7(3) (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], http://www.un.org/
icty/legaldoc/index.htm (May 25, 1993) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
67 See Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20, 2001). A
commander exercises de jure authority when he or she acting pursuant to an official
appointment. Id. para. 186. De facto authority results from exercises of command
authority outside of "formal legal authority." Id. For a more in-depth definition of de
jure and de facto command, see Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior
Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 573, 578-81 (1999).
68 See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1298 (Barkett, Circuit Judge, concurring).
69 Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20, 2001).
70 Id. para. 197.
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is exercised."71  The ICTY did not explicitly state that the
prosecutor bore the burden of proving that the defendant exercised
effective control over his troops.72
The much-maligned International Criminal Court has also
asserted jurisdiction over military commanders via the command
responsibility doctrine.73 The Rome Statute, however, does not
assign the burden of proof or burden of production to either the
plaintiff or defendant."
IV. Analysis of Ford v. Garcia
Despite congressional clarity as to which bodily injuries
constitute a violation of the TVPA, the statute is ambiguous as to
which actions of indirect actors, such as military commanders,
"subjects an individual" to "torture" or "extrajudicial killing."75
Congress has made it clear that the command responsibility
doctrine applies:76 "[A] higher official need not have personally
performed or ordered the abuses in order to be held liable. Under
international law,.., anyone with higher authority who
authorized, tolerated[,] or knowingly ignored those acts is liable
for them."7 7  This statement, however, only avails the federal
courts to the use of the command responsibility doctrine. It does
not answer the questions of (1) who holds sufficient authority to
be classified as a "higher official," such as a military commander;
(2) what influence and power must a military commander hold in
order to be liable under the command responsibility doctrine; and
(3) which party is assigned the burden of proving the elements of
71 Id. para. 256.
72 Id.; Ford, 289 F.3d at 1291-92.
73 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28(a) (1998) [hereinafter
Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court. Id. at
art. 1. The International Criminal Court asserts jurisdiction over "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole," including "genocide,"
"crimes against humanity," "war crimes," and "crime[s] of aggression." Id. at art. 5(1).
The United States, however, has refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Presses for Total Exemption From
War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2002, at A6.
74 See Rome Statute, supra note 73 (failing to address burden of proof issues).
75 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2 (2000).
76 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991).
77 Id.
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the command responsibility doctrine. Although Ford did not
definitively answer these questions, the court's analysis and
responses to the aforementioned issues will have an immense
impact on future litigation brought under the TVPA.
A. Applications of Actual and Apparent Authority
Ford has set the stage for future American courts to implement
multiple standards for proving the superior-subordinate element of
the command responsibility doctrine.78 The TVPA states that one
who tortures or extrajudicially kills another "under actual or
apparent authority" is liable under the TVPA.79 As discussed
above, de jure authority is the international law synonym for
"actual authority," and de facto authority is the synonym for
"apparent authority. '8° Logically, if a military commander does
not possess either dejure or defacto control, the commander does
not have sufficient actual or apparent authority to be found liable
under the TVPA. As a result, one of the first questions that the
factfinder in a TVPA case must answer is whether or not the
defendant held dejure authority over the troops that committed the
tort.
Ford's refusal to set forth a definitive standard as to what
effect de jure authority has on the satisfaction of the superior-
subordinate element leaves the question open for various lower
court interpretations. 81  Although Ford discusses various
international tribunal interpretations at great length,82 it leaves
room for three separate avenues of approach that a future district
78 Element one of the trial court's command responsibility doctrine definition
requires the plaintiff to prove "[t]hat persons under defendant's effective command had
committed, were committing, or were about to commit torture and extrajudicial killing."
See Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1287 n.3 (11 th Cir. 2002).
79 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, § 2(a)
(2000).
80 See Bantekas, supra note 67 at 578-81.
81 The defendants in Ford undisputedly held dejure authority over the soldiers who
tortured and killed the victims. See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1286 (explaining that the
defendants' only defense was that they did not have "effective control" of their troops).
Under Ford, if the defendants do not concede that they were the de jure commanders at
the time of the alleged tort, the plaintiff may bear the burden of proof of showing
"effective command." Id. at 1286.
82 See id. at 1290-93.
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judge might take in determining whether a commander with de
jure authority satisfies the effective command element.
1. De Jure Authority Alone May Satisfy the Superior-
Subordinate Relationship Requirement
A district court may determine that all a plaintiff must do to
satisfy the superior-subordinate relationship element of the
command responsibility doctrine is to establish that the
commander had de jure authority over the troops committing the
tort. 3 Although Ford states "effective control" is "an element
which must be proved in command responsibility cases," it does
not clarify the relationship between the term "effective control"
and the "superior-subordinate relationship" or the "failure to
prevent or punish" elements of the command responsibility
doctrine. 4 As a result, Ford's analysis of international law does
not comport with its ultimate holding.
Ford initially appears to support the theory that the "failure to
prevent or punish" element and "effective control" are
synonomous.85 In its analysis of international cases regarding
effective control, Ford states that "[t]he consensus is that '[t]he
concept of effective control over a subordinate in the sense of a
material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct, however
that control is exercised[,] is the threshold to be reached in
establishing a superior-subordinate relationship."86 In other words,
if a commander cannot either prevent torture or punish troops who
83 See id at 1292. Another issue that may arise in future cases is whether or not the
government that allegedly granted the commander de jure authority actually had the
power to do so. For example, the Taliban regime, which controlled Afghanistan from
1996-2001, was only formally recognized by three other nations. See, e.g., John
Bowman, The Taliban: Afghanistan's Fundamentalist Leaders, CBC News, at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/background/taliban.html (May 2001, updated July
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation). It is unclear whether or not commanders in a regime with questionable
international legal legitimacy would have the requisite power to confer dejure authority.
Such a question is not present in Ford, however, and accordingly will not be discussed in
this note.
84 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1292-93; see also supra text accompanying note 60
(explaining the three elements of the command responsibility doctrine).
85 See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1290-93.
86 Id. at 1290 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20,
2001) para. 256).
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torture others, this lack of "effective control" prevents him from
being held liable under the "failure to prevent or punish" element,
which in turn precludes liability under the "superior-subordinate
relationship" element. Ford, however, contradicts what it purports
to be the international consensus definition of "effective control"
by upholding the district court's definition of "effective
command."87
The district court stated that a commander has "effective
command" over his troops when he "has the legal authority and
the practical ability to exert control over his troops."88 One logical
way to apply this statement is to assign the clause "has the legal
authority" to the superior-subordinate relationship element and the
"practical ability to exert control over his troops" clause to the
failure to prevent and punish element. If a future court applies the
district court's "effective command" instruction in this manner, all
that the court needs to satisfy the superior-subordinate element of
the command responsibility doctrine is proof that the commander
had de jure authority over the tortfeasors. In other words,
effective control is irrelevant when proving the superior-
subordinate relationship element. Since a commander would
exercise effective control by preventing the torture or punishing
the perpetrators, the effective control issue would be whether or
not the commander had the ability to do so.
A simple reading of In re Yamashita also leans toward finding
that de jure authority alone can satisfy the superior-subordinate
relationship element.89 In Yamashita, the Supreme Court refused
to consider any defenses such as a commander's loss of ability to
prevent and punish improper actions by subordinates.9" Justice
Murphy's dissenting opinion in Yamashita admitted that General
Yamashita could not have maintained control of his army.91
87 Id. at 1287 n.3.
88 Id.
89 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
90 Id. at 17.
91 In a brilliant yet cynical "rewording" of the United States' charges against
Yamashita, Justice Murphy wrote,
We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possible to destroy
and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective control of your
personnel, your ability to wage war. In those respects we have succeeded. We
have defeated and crushed your forces. And now we charge and condemn you
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Hence, the only Supreme Court opinion that addresses liability via
command authority holds that de jure command authority is
sufficient to satisfy the superior-subordinate relationship element.
Notice, however, that Yamashita eliminates the need to determine
effective control for a different reason. Instead of making
effective control a requirement of the "failure to prevent or
punish" element, it simply holds that de jure authority alone is
enough to establish "effective control."
Commentators have also stated that de jure authority alone
may be enough to establish a sufficient superior-subordinate
relationship:92 "[T]he existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship can be established in two independent ways, de jure
and de facto. The most obvious means for the assumption of
power is through official delegation of command from a pertinent
office. "
93
2. The De Jure and De Facto Distinctions are Irrelevant
Another highly plausible interpretation of the TVPA obviates
the need for any classification of a commander's source of
authority. Under this interpretation of the command responsibility
doctrine, the central question that a factfinder must answer is
whether the defendant had "effective control" of the tortfeasors. If
the factfinder determines that the defendant exercised effective
control of the troops, the defendant is subject to liability. Under
such an interpretation, the determination of whether or not the
defendant held de jure authority over the tortfeasors is, at best,
only a factor in determining whether the defendant exercised
"effective control. 94
for having been inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the
period when we were so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces and
blocking your ability to maintain effective control. Many terrible atrocities
were committed by your disorganized troops. Because these atrocities were so
widespread we will not bother to charge or prove that you committed, ordered
or condoned any of them. We will assume that they must have resulted from
your inefficiency and negligence as a commander. In short, we charge you with
the crime of inefficiency in controlling your troops.
Id. at 34-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
92 See Bantekas, supra note 67, at 578-79 (discussing sources of command
authority and dejure command).
93 Id. at 578.
94 See Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
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The statements of the law made by Ford illustrate why this
approach may be attractive to judges when instructing juries in
future command responsibility cases. Ford states that the
consensus definition of "effective control" in international law is
the "ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct."95 Furthermore,
Ford indicates that "a showing of the defendant's actual ability to
control the guilty troops is required as part of the plaintiffs burden
under the superior-subordinate prong of command responsibility,
whether the plaintiff attempts to assert liability under a theory of
defacto or dejure authority."
The court based these statements of law on ICTY cases, which
are based on Article 7(3) of the ICTY statute.97 In essence, the
court is saying that a court may impose liability on a defendant if
he exercised "effective control" at the time of the torture or
extrajudicial killing.98
If a district court were to apply such a principle, there would
be no need to distinguish the source of the defendant's authority.
In other words, "[i]f liability for the acts of others is established
through the element of authority over subordinates, it follows that
the mere existence of such authority, whether acquired de jure or
defacto, renders one a superior for the purposes of Article 7(3) of
the ICTY Statute." 99 Ford stated that the ICTY cases "provide
insight into how the doctrine [of command responsibility] should
be applied in TVPA cases."' ' Accordingly, a future district or
circuit judge may not even concern herself with the distinction
between dejure and defacto authority. 101
3. De Jure Commanders are Presumed to Have the
Requisite Superior-Subordinate Relationship
The third interpretation that a future judge may take when
applying the command responsibility doctrine to the TVPA is to
95 Id. at 1290 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20,
2001) para. 256).
96 Id. at 1291 (citing Delalic, para. 196).
97 Id. at 1290-91; ICTY Statute, supra note 66.
98 See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1290-91.
99 Bantekas, supra note 67, at 579.




instruct a jury that finding that the defendant had dejure authority
"results in only a presumption of effective control., 10 2 The ICTY
case of Prosecutor v. Delalic took this approach.'0 3 Ford states
that Delalic indicates that de jure authority is "prima facie
evidence of effective control, which accordingly can be rebutted
only by the defense putting forth evidence to the finder of fact that
the defendant lacked this effective control."'
0 4
Ford, however, simply restated this proposition and applied
one aspect of current domestic law, which makes a distinction
between the "burden of production" and the "burden of
persuasion."'0 5 Neither the ICTY Statute nor Delalic make such an
explicit distinction.0 6 Since Delalic does not distinguish between
the burdens of persuasion and production, a future court could
follow a different line of domestic authority to place the burden of
persuasion on the defendant to prove that he did not have effective
control once a plaintiff proves dejure authority.0 7
102 Id. at 1291.
103 Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20, 2001) para. 197.
104 Ford, 298 F.3d at 1291.
105 Id.; see supra Part IV(B) (discussing burden of proof allocation). Ford
primarily relies on cases from its own jurisdiction, as well as Black's Law Dictionary,
when analyzing the effect of the presumption. See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1291-92.
106 See ICTY Statute, supra note 66, art. 7(3); see Delalic para. 197. Since Delalic
does not directly address the effect of the "presumption of effective control," a federal
court in the future may not apply domestic law in the same manner as Ford when
determining where the burden of persuasion falls once the plaintiff proves that the
defendant held dejure authority.
107 See Ford, 289 F.3d at 1291-92. Although Ford points out that the ICTY Statute
has never shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant, it chooses not to rule on the
issue. Id. Interestingly, there is case law from the Eleventh Circuit that would support
the defendant holding the burden of persuasion when attempting a lack of effective
control defense. In United States v. Continental Ins. Co., the court dealt with another
case of first impression regarding the assignment of the burden of proof. 776 F.2d 962
(1 lth Cir. 1985). When determining where the burden of proof should be placed, the
court stated that, "Neither this circuit nor any other circuit that we are aware of has
decided which party bears the burden of proof on this issue. [We are a]dhering to the
common law guide that the party in the best position to present the requisite evidence
should bear the burden of proof . Id. at 964. Since a TVPA defendant is likely to be
in a better position than the plaintiff to prove a lack of effective control, a future court
has ample authority to place the burden of persuasion regarding effective control on the
defendant once the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case. See infra Part IV(B)(1) and
accompanying text (explaining why a defendant is in a better position to prove a lack of
effective control).
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B. The Closing and Opening of the Door to Future TVPA
Claims
1. The Closing of the Door: The Possible Effect of
Assigning the Plaintiff the Burden of Proving
"Effective Control"
Ford refused to reverse the trial court's jury instructions that
placed the burden of persuasion for all elements of the command
responsibility doctrine on the plaintiffs. 108 There was no dispute
that the plaintiff had the burden of proving the prima facie
elements of the command responsibility doctrine.'0 9 As discussed
above in Part IV(A), however, the court did not answer the
question of what the plaintiff must prove in order to satisfy the
superior-subordinate relationship element, nor did it clarify the
relationship between the term "effective control" and the elements
of the command responsibility doctrine."' A future court may, in
fact, adopt the plaintiffs' position in Ford. The plaintiffs
contended that once they established their prima facie case, the
burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to produce an
affirmative defense.' 11
Ford, however, upheld the trial court's jury instruction that
placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff"2 to prove that the
defendants exerted "effective command." ' 1 3 The court set forth
the possibility that where de jure authority creates a "presumption
of effective control," the presumption "shifts the burden of
production with respect to the element it concerns, but not the
burden of persuasion.""' 4 Applying this standard to Ford, once the
108 Id. at 1292.
109 See id. at 1289; supra note 60 and accompanying text for the prima facie
elements of the command responsibility doctrine.
110 See supra Part Ill(A) and accompanying text.
I Ford, 289 F.3d at 1289.
112 Id. at 1292.
113 Id. at 1287.
114 Id. at 1291. The Eleventh Circuit differentiates a "presumption" from an
"inference." See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 1998).
Whereas a "presumption" never shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant, an
"inference" may only be rebutted with an affirmative defense. See id. at 1184 n.10.
When offering an affirmative defense, "[t]he defendant would therefore carry the burden
of persuasion in regard to that explanation." Id.
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defendants were established to be the de jure commanders of the
tortfeasors, they had the burden of producing admissible, non-
hypothetical evidence to show that they did not have effective
control of their troops.115 Once they introduced such evidence, the
presumption dropped, with the plaintiff still holding the burden of
persuasion. 116  Therefore, if the only evidence that the Ford
plaintiffs had to prove in order to satisfy the superior-subordinate
element was the fact that the defendants were the tortfeasors' de
jure commanders, the defendants would have successfully
defeated the claim.'" 7
Proving that a commander exercised de jure authority over
troops is unlikely to be difficult to prove in cases where a
legitimate and globally recognized government commissioned the
defendant. 118 "Formal executive structures, such as state entities,
usually vest such authority by passing legislative acts, which
provide evidence of de jure command."' ' 9  Thus, in many
foreseeable cases, a plaintiff need only provide publicly accessible
documents as evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case
against a commander. Even in cases in which the defendants
commanded for the military of a developing nation, defendants
will likely stipulate that they were the de jure commanders of the
tortfeasing troops.120
If a plaintiff must also affirmatively prove a commander's
ability to prevent or punish the illicit activity in order to prove
"effective control," the evidence will not be as easy to procure.
The ICTY has stated that one way to prove effective control is
through a "thorough analysis of the distribution of tasks" within a
military unit.121 In order to determine what was the "distribution
of tasks," the plaintiff would likely have to interview former
soldiers in the commander's unit. These former soldiers may be
dead, may be difficult to find, or may still be loyal to the
115 Id. For a discussion of the difference between "burden of persuasion" and
"burden ofproduction", see Walker, 158 F.3d at 1184-85.
116 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1291-92.
117 See id.
118 But see supra note 83 (discussing unrecognized and illegitimate governments).
119 Bantekas, supra note 67, at 578.
120 Such was the case in Ford. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
121 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, 108 I.L.R. 21, 31 (1998).
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
defendant. 122 The law of the country in which the crimes occurred
may not be amenable to the plaintiffs suit.123 In addition, if the
plaintiff decided to proceed to trial, the plaintiff would be required
to pay for the costs of obtaining the testimony of the witnesses.
Since most foreseeable cases of torture will occur in a foreign land
that may still be politically unstable, the costs of such a venture
would be enormous, and would almost surely price the plaintiff
out of bringing the claim.
124
Ford illustrates that the defendant is usually in a better position
to affirmatively disprove the effectiveness of his dejure command
than the plaintiff would be in an attempt to prove it. In Ford, the
defendants successfully called the former U.S. Ambassador to El
Salvador to testify on their behalf as a factual and expert
witness.2 5 In addition, the defendant will undoubtedly know who
was in his unit, as well as any specific incidents that would
demonstrate lack of effective control at the time of the torture.
The defendant, however, would face the same resource issues as
the plaintiff if the court placed the burden of persuasion on the
defendant.126  Therefore, if the defendant in a future case is
indigent, he may be unable to successfully prove that he truly did
not have effective command of the tortfeasors.
122 For example, the ICTY is based on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. See
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Seeking Legal Remedies for War Crimes, 9 J. INT'L INST. (2002),
available at http://www.umich.edu/-iinet/joumal/vol6nol/alvarez.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). The area is
still ravaged by the effects of a decade of civil war, and "[g]overnments in the region
have not always cooperated with the tribunal." Id.
123 The plaintiff will not have the benefits of obtaining evidence under the mandate
of the United Nations, as is the case with ICTY and ICTR prosecutors. See ICTY
Statute, supra note 66, art. 29 (requiring the co-operation and judicial assistance of all
member states); see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art.
28 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR].
124 The ICTY and ICTR are able to prosecute violations of the law of war because
they are funded by the United Nations. The TVPA, however, is a United States federal
civil statute. The United States will not fund such claims. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367 at
7 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 89-90 (explaining no federal budgetary
impact). Even if a law firm takes the case on a contingent basis, Ford's allocation of the
burden of proof makes it unlikely that a firm would take such a costly and risky lawsuit
on a contingent fee basis.
125 Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (11 th Cir. 2002).
126 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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2. The Opening of the Door: The Possible Requirement
that Commanders See Into the Future
The fact that Ford did not strike down the trial court's
definition of "effective command" may lead a future court to
require that commanders never make a mistake in a wartime
tactical decision.127 In other words, a commander who loses
control of his troops may be held strictly liable for the subsequent
torture committed by his troops, even if he could not have foreseen
the loss of control. This proposition was first set forth in Justice
Murphy's dissenting opinion in In re Yamashita.'28 In short,
Yamashita lost all control of his troops not because of his own
wanton negligence or criminal conduct, but instead because of
American attacks on his command and control center and on his
supply lines.'29
By endorsing incongruous definitions of "effective control"
and "effective command," Ford presents two differing paths to
future courts. On one hand, Ford supports a definition of
"effective control" as the "material ability to prevent or punish
criminal conduct, however that control is exercised."' 30 If a future
court adopts this definition of effective control, a commander such
as General Yamashita, who lost control of his troops because
American attacks were breaking his lines of communication, could
not be found liable, since he had no ability to prevent or punish the
torture or extrajudicial killings. On the other hand, Ford upholds
the trial court's definition of effective command. 3' It is
foreseeable that a future court will simply adopt this definition
because it has already withstood an appellate challenge.
If a future court uses the trial court's effective command
definition in a case where a commander lost effective control of
his troops due to incorrect tactical decisions, the commander could
127 The U.S. Army Field Manual on Military Leadership states, "[tiactical
knowledge is the ability to employ your soldiers and their equipment. Combat arms
leaders work directly to gain an advantage over the enemy ...." Headquarters,
Department of the Army, FIELD MANUAL 22-100: MILITARY LEADERSHIP 41 (1990).
128 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
130 Ford, 289 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic (Appeals Chamber ICTY,
Feb. 20, 2001) para. 256).
131 Id. at 1287, 1292-93.
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be held strictly liable for the actions of his troops. The trial court's
definition of effective command requires a commander to have
"the legal authority and the practical ability to exert control over
his troops. A commander cannot, however, be excused from his
duties where his own actions cause or significantly contribute to
the lack of effective control."' 13
2
A commander's tactical decisions are unquestionably "his own
actions." And even a legal and well-reasoned tactical decision
may ultimately lead to a commander's complete and permanent
loss of control of his unit.'33 Since the trial court's definition of
"effective command" neither clarifies what the term "his own
actions" means, nor provides an exemption for a commander's
tactical decisions that ultimately sever his effective control, a
commander in such a situation will be deemed to have "effective
command" over troops that he has no "practical ability" to
control.134
Not even the "failure to prevent or punish" element will
necessarily save a commander who has lost control of his troops
due to a flawed tactical decision caused by faulty intelligence
because a commander always has the option of surrender.135 For
example, if General Yamashita had Surrendered immediately upon
learning that his troops were torturing and extrajudicially killing
Filipino citizens, he would have prevented a large number of war
crimes committed by his troops.'6 If a future factfinder finds that
132 Id. at 1287 n.3.
133 Since the inception of warfare, commanders at all levels make their tactical
decisions based on available intelligence and resources. See, e.g., GEOFFREY REGAN,
MILITARY BLUNDERS 89-93 (2000). Some or all of the intelligence on which the
commander relies, such as that of enemy strength or likely enemy attack plans, may be
faulty. See id As a result, the commander may make a well-reasoned and seemingly
informed decision that, in retrospect, exposed his troops to a superior enemy force. See
id. (explaining tactical decisions based on faulty intelligence).
134 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
136 Once a commander surrenders, logistical support and supplies will no longer be
available to troops, and those committing illegal acts will be forced to cease their
activities sooner than if they were to continue receiving supplies. For example, most of
the atrocities committed by Yamashita's soldiers occurred in January and February of
1945, but Yamashita did not surrender until September of that year. In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1, 32 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Assuming that Yamashita knew of the
atrocities when they were occurring, his immediate surrender would have greatly
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surrender was a "necessary and reasonable" option to prevent the
violence, a commander, such as General Yamashita, could be
found liable under the TVPA because he had neither the practical
ability to control his troops committing the torture nor the desire to
surrender in a war that was not yet over. 137
V. Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals missed an opportunity
to ensure that future American courts will be able to implement
the TVPA in the manner that Congress and the President
intended."' Congress explained that the TVPA was needed to
"establish an unambiguous and modem basis for a cause of action
that has been successfully maintained under an existing law,
section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims
Act). 139 It further stated that the TVPA is needed to establish "a
clear and specific remedy, not limited to aliens, for torture and
extrajudicial killing.""14  This means that Congress wanted to
extend to domestic plaintiffs a remedy that existed for years under
the ATCA for aliens. After Ford's imprecise codihcation and
application of the command responsibility doctrine, American
plaintiffs may not have the remedy that Congress intended.
Under both the ATCA and the TVPA, courts will look to
international law to formulate a codification of the command
responsibility doctrine.'41 Ford, however, upheld a trial court jury
expedited an American victory, which in turn would have prevented a number of
atrocities.
137 The "necessary and reasonable" standard was that adopted by the Ford trial
court. Ford, 289 F.3d at 1287. See also Damaska, supra note 9, at 480-81 ("And even if
well-meaning international judges disavow strict liability, the disturbing possibility
cannot be ruled out that a helpless commander be convicted as a scapegoat for atrocities
committed on the territory formally under his control.").
138 See H.R. REP. No. 102-367 at 3 (1991) reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86
(explaining Congress's intent in passing the TVPA). See Statement by President George
Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2092, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 465 (Mar. 16, 1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 73) 91 (stating that a "strong and continuing
commitment to advancing respect for a protection of human rights throughout the world"
was the reason that he signed the bill into law).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing the
use of international law in ATCA cases).
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instruction that differs significantly from what most
commentators, and even Ford itself, accept as current customary
international law.14 2  The trial court's "effective command"
instruction will allow for multiple interpretations of the command
responsibility doctrine.
If future federal courts follow the trial court's definition of the
command responsibility doctrine, plaintiffs will be forced to prove
that a commander has "effective control." '143  There is an
abundance of material, however, to support a court's finding that
the "law of nations" only requires a plaintiff to prove that a
defendant exercised de jure command, or that once a plaintiff
proves de jure command, the burden of persuasion to disprove a
superior-subordinate relationship shifts back to the defendant.
144
This lack of clarity will make it difficult for both plaintiffs and
defendants litigating a TVPA claim to know how to address each
element of the command responsibility doctrine.
Ford leaves open many questions that only time, torture, and
rich plaintiffs will solve.
JOHN W. BROOKER
142 See supra Part II(B)-IV(A).
143 See supra note 67 (defining defacto command).
144 See supra Part IV.
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